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Abstract: In the paper we discuss variable and generative forms of autonomy. Variable autonomy is discussed in terms 
of the practicalities in designing autonomous agents, dealing as it does with the notion of degrees of 
autonomy and hence issues of agent control. The major part of the paper discusses an absolute, theoretically 
grounded notion of autonomy: the ability to generate one’s own goals. This theoretical account of autonomy 
is embedded in the larger SMART framework and is intimately linked with the issue of motivation. 
Autonomous agents are motivated agents in that for the generation of goals an agent needs a set of higher 
order, non-derivative sources of action, or in our terminology, motivations. Autonomous agents in the 
SMART framework form the basis and source of action in multi-agent systems, which can thus propagate 
through the other entities in the system, such as non-autonomous agents and objects.  We conclude with a 
discussion regarding the situations an autonomous agent would be willing to relinquish its autonomy thus 
linking the generative and variable notions of autonomy.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Autonomy is one of the most used but least operationalised words in the fields of intelligent agents 
and multi-agent systems.  This is strange in computer science where typically concepts must be 
clearly and precisely defined in order for them to be incorporated into theories, models and 
implementations. In reality, this is seldom a problem as it is often assumed that the autonomy of an 
agent is something that arises from the overall flexibility of the agent’s behaviour as it goes about its 
business in its environment away from human direction. Thus an agent engaging with others in its 
environment in a seemingly intelligent and flexible way, making decisions that reflect its goals, 
overcoming obstacles etc., would most probably be stamped with the descriptive label of being 
autonomous. However, this simply indicates that autonomy is merely a description of a variety of 
flexible and perhaps adaptive behaviours. Nothing in the agent itself, no process or architecture, can 
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be identified as the controller or source of the agent’s autonomy and, as a consequence, autonomy 
begins to acquire the nature of an emergent property.  
Autonomy is undeniably a critical issue in the field (Castelfranchi, 1995; Barber and Martin, 
1999), yet many, it seems, are content to assume it as an emergent property without giving it any real 
concrete definition. Agents are often taken to be autonomous by default, and as such there seems 
little need to add the tautologous prefix in explicitly considering autonomous agents. Some in the 
field, however (Balkenius, 1993; Castelfranchi, 1995), view autonomy in agents as an important yet 
problematic issue that demands attention.  
Seeing this problem with the lack of focus in the use of the term autonomy, some researchers are 
beginning to think more carefully about what autonomy really means. And, in the literature, two very 
different conceptions of what autonomy should mean are beginning to emerge. On the one hand, 
some researchers operationalize autonomy as the level or degree to which an agent can achieve its 
goals without intervention and thus strongly relate the notion of autonomy to an agent’s dependence 
upon others. High dependence under this definition equates to low autonomy. However, there is 
another emphasis that considers autonomy as an absolute enabler for generating an agent’s own goals 
in response to different situations. While the achievement of some of these goals may depend on 
other agents, this dependence does not affect the autonomy of the goal-generating agent.  
In this paper, we consider these two views of autonomy in more detail, focusing in particular on 
the latter view, which we have adopted as the basis for an extensive theory of agenthood over recent 
years. We begin with a short consideration of autonomy as independence between agents before 
moving on to consider autonomy as goal generation to greater depth. We introduce the concept of 
motivation, review relevant work in this area, and then describe how motivation in our model 
underlies generative autonomy in our Structured and Modular Agents and Relationship Types 
(SMART) framework. We end our description of SMART by describing the implications of this 
model for interacting agents requiring assistance from others. Finally, we review the two views and 
try to draw some conclusions. 
 
2. TWO VIEWS ON AUTONOMY 
2.1 Adjustable Autonomy  
One view of agents holds that once we've solved all the technical problems, it will be possible to 
have agents that are able to explore the (virtual) world and perform all sorts of tasks for their users, 
all with complete autonomy and integrity with regards to user likes and dislikes. These agents can be 
likened to surrogate selves that embody the user’s desires and aspirations, traveling about the cyber-
sphere exploiting opportunities in the user's stead, making money, closing deals, securing contracts, 
and so on. While this picture is perhaps a little rosy, it is certainly a desirable one. However, the 
likelihood of any of the above coming true depends (amongst other things) on the key issue of trust. 
If organisations and individuals are to use software agents to look out for their interests in electronic 
worlds as suggested above, then the agents carrying out such interactions must be trustworthy; users 
will want guarantees that the software will not incur losses through faulty or inept operation. This is 
perfectly natural and proper, and occurs in the real world when human agents are engaged to act on 
behalf of others. In such situations, the way to avoid problems with new tasks is simply to employ 
training; usually involving the supervision of some or all of the task at hand with information 
flowing backwards and forwards between the two parties. In this way, an employer can be sure that 
an employee understands the nature of the task and is aware of the potential problems, and can 
require the employee to request assistance if problems arise. Now, this relates to autonomy in that the 
more an employer trusts an employee to achieve a task correctly, the more autonomy in relation to 
the task will be bestowed upon the employee. If this is the case with human agents, then perhaps we 
can use the same system with electronic agents.  
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Increasingly, some researchers are aiming to design agents that have an adjustable autonomy such 
that it can be reeled in or out depending on the circumstances. Barber and Martin (1999), for 
example, link an agent’s autonomy to its ability to influence the decision-making process for a given 
problem. In their view, an agent acting alone has complete autonomy in that it holds all the decision-
making power. Similarly, an agent making all decisions for other agents, as well as itself, has 
complete autonomy and power over itself and its subjects. An agent that shares decision-making with 
others is in a consensus relation with them, and thus its autonomy is limited in proportion to the 
number of agents involved in making those decisions. Finally, an agent that has no involvement in 
the decision-making process consequently has no autonomy and is command driven.  
What these models offer is a way of representing autonomy in an explicit way that then enables it 
to be measured and manipulated. Different dimensions of autonomy are suggested by Brainov and 
Hexmoor (2001), such as simple autonomy from the user; autonomy from the environment (which 
changes as a response to the predictability of that environment) and group autonomy (how free the 
agent is from interference by others). Once identified, these aspects of autonomy can be measured 
and adjusted according to the experimenter’s whim. Perhaps the major immediate difficulty with 
adjustable autonomy is the problem inherent in recognizing when an adjustment in autonomy is 
required. Should there be some way to oversee and measure the performance of an agent in order to 
make necessary changes in its autonomy, such as increasing its reliability on another’s (perhaps the 
user’s) judgment? If so, then how often should the agent’s performance be checked? Or should the 
agent itself decide when it should give up its independence and seek the aid of others? Some 
solutions have been offered (for example, see (Barber and Martin, 1999)) but there remain many 
open issues.  
 
2.2 Autonomy and Goal Generation 
Our own notion of autonomy focuses on an agent’s ability to generate its own goals. A dictionary 
definition will tell us, among other things, that autonomy amounts to freedom of will (and we will 
add that it includes the ability to exercise that will). In short, this means that it provides the ability to 
exercise choice, which is particularly relevant in the context of goals and goal-directed behaviour, as 
in Castelfranchi’s notions of goal (or motivational) autonomy (Castelfranchi, 1995). Delving further, 
we can see that the literal translation of autonomy from the Greek auto-nomy is self law or self 
government, and presupposes the ability to generate one’s own rules (or in our terms, goals) for 
living. The self-generation of goals therefore becomes the defining characteristic of autonomy. In this 
view, autonomous agents are able to generate their own goals, to select between multiple alternative 
goals to pursue, and to decide to adopt goals from others (to further their own ends).  
Thus from a purely conceptual or theoretical point of view removed from practical considerations, 
autonomy can naturally be regarded as absolute, without dimension or measure of degree – one can 
either generate one's own goals or one cannot (ignoring possibilities of degrees of goal generation, of 
course). Yet, this strong view of autonomy contrasts with much of the practical work with agents 
described earlier in which autonomy is taken to be the same as independence, a very distinctly 
relative notion. In what might be called this weak view, a non-autonomous agent either depends on 
others or is an automaton, while an autonomous agent can either be independent or depend on others. 
It is this last point that seems to suggest that autonomy is not the same as independence – an agent 
does not simply lose its autonomy by virtue of depending on another for a particular goal; situations 
of dependence occur also for autonomous agents. 
Practically then, the notion of independence can be used as an approximation for autonomy with 
the added benefit that it admits the dimensions and measures of degree that are missing from the 
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strong view. In this sense it might be considered as a valuable practical operationalisation of 
autonomy, and provides a way to characterise different dependence situations. 
 
3. AUTONOMY THROUGH MOTIVATION 
For all the difficulty in pinning down autonomy, it is key in our view to understanding the nature 
and behaviour both of individual agents, and of interactions between them. In a series of papers over 
a number of years, we have described and formally specified an extended theory of agent interaction, 
based on goals and motivations, which takes exactly this standpoint. The theory describes the 
SMART framework for categorizing different agents (Luck and d’Inverno, 2001), and has been used 
as a basis for investigating aspects of the relationships between agents (d’Inverno and Luck 2000), 
providing an operational account of their invocation and destruction (d’Inverno and Luck 1997), as 
well as for reformulating existing systems and theories, including those relating to dependence 
situations (d’Inverno and Luck 1996). 
In essence, autonomous agents possess goals that are generated within rather than adopted from 
other agents. These goals are generated from motivations, which are higher-level non-derivative 
components that characterise the nature of the agent. As we will discuss in more detail shortly, they 
can be considered to be the desires or preferences that affect the outcome of a given reasoning or 
behavioural task. For example, as we have pointed out elsewhere, greed is not a goal in the classical 
artificial intelligence sense since it does not specify a state of affairs to be achieved, nor is it 
describable in terms of the environment. However, it may give rise to the generation of a goal to rob 
a bank. The motivation of greed and the goal of robbing a bank are clearly distinct, with the former 
providing a reason to do the latter, and the latter specifying how to achieve the former. 
This view of autonomous agents is based on the generation and transfer of goals between agents. 
More specifically, something is an agent if it can be viewed as satisfying a goal that is first created 
and then, if necessary and appropriate, transferred to another. It is the adoption of goals that gives 
rise to agenthood, and it is the self-generation of goals that is responsible for autonomy.  Thus an 
agent is just something that is either useful to another agent in terms of satisfying that agent's goals, 
or independently purposeful.  Importantly, agents rely on the existence of others to provide the goals 
that they adopt for instantiation as agents. In order to escape an infinite regress of goal adoption, 
however, we define autonomous agents to be just agents that generate their own goals from 
motivations. 
Social behaviour arises as a result of individual agents interacting with each other (through 
cooperation, competition, and other such forms of interaction) so as to exploit the resources available 
in a rich and dynamic multi-agent domain. If agents are to make use of others to help them in their 
tasks, such social behaviour is critical. Underlying this cooperation is the transfer or adoption of 
goals from one agent to another, a subtle and complex process that depends on the nature of the 
agents involved. 
3.1 What is Motivation?  
According to Halliday, the word motivation does not refer to a specific set of readily identified 
processes (Halliday, 1983). Though for practical purposes motivation can be discussed in terms of 
drives and incentives, the push and pull of behaviour. Drives are internally generated signals that tell 
the organism that it has violated a homeostatic balance such as hunger, thirst etc. There are also the 
circadian drives such as sleep and wakefulness. Incentives originate outside of the organism and can 
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vary in their attractiveness to the organism arousing more or less motivation. Incentives can be both 
positive and negative for example a positive incentive usually causes approach behaviours such as a 
person deciding to buy a car due to the attractiveness of its specifications. A negative incentive 
causes avoidance behaviours such as a shy person avoiding social interaction. Motivation has long 
been seen as a key concept in the organisation of behaviour within the psychological and ethological 
sciences. Our focus, however, is on providing an effective control mechanism for governing the 
behaviour and reasoning of autonomous agents through the use of motivations. Though we focus on a 
computational approach, in this section we will discuss related work. 
In Cognitive psychology researchers come close to the intended meaning of motivation that we 
propose here. Kunda (1990) informally defines motivation to be, “any wish, desire, or preference that 
concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task” and suggests that motivation affects reasoning in a 
variety of ways including the accessing, constructing and evaluating of beliefs and evidence, and 
decision making. Much work has been done experimentally to explicate these thoughts but work is 
just beginning to put them in a computational context. 
One early example is Simon (1979), who takes motivation to be “that which controls attention at 
any given time,” and explores the relation of motivation to information-processing behaviour, but 
from a cognitive perspective. Sloman and Croucher (1981), and Sloman (1987) alone have elaborated 
on Simon's work, showing how motivations are relevant to emotions and the development of a 
computational theory of mind.  
Problem solving can be considered to be the task of finding actions that achieve the current goals. 
In this way goals provide the reason and context for behaviour. But how are the goals to be chosen? 
Typically the agent chooses a goal if the environmental conditions support the pre-conditions 
necessary for the goal; that is the external context determines goal selection. However, in real 
biological agents often the same environmental cues elicit different behaviour. This can be attributed 
to the current motivations of the agent. This internal context is often missing in computational agent 
based systems. Clearly, this is inadequate for research concentrating on modeling autonomous agents 
and creatures, which requires an understanding of how such goals are generated and selected. 
Additionally, it is inadequate for research that aims to provide flexibility of reasoning in a variety of 
contexts, regardless of concerns with modeling artificial agents. Such flexibility can be achieved 
through the use of motivations which can lead to different results even when goals remain the same 
(Luck, 1993). 
In Sloman’s development of Simon’s Ideas (Simon, 1979), Sloman argues explicitly for the need 
for a “store of ‘springs of action’ (motives)” (Sloman and Croucher, 1981). For Sloman, motives 
represent to the agent what to do in a given situation and include desires, wishes, tastes, preferences 
and ideals. Key to Sloman’s conception of motives is their role in processing. Importantly, Sloman 
distinguishes between two types of motives. First-order motives directly specify goals, whereas 
second order motives generate new motives or resolve conflicts between competing motives – these 
are termed motive generators and motive comparators. According to Sloman, a motive produced by a 
motive generator may have the status of a desire. This relatively early work presents a broad picture 
of a two-tiered control of behaviour: motives occupy the top level, providing the drive or urge to 
produce the lower level goals that specify the behaviour itself.  In subsequent work, the terminology 
changes to distinguish between nonderivative motivators or goals and derivative motivators or goals, 
rather than between motivators and goals themselves.  Nevertheless, the notion of derivative and 
nonderivative mental attitudes makes one point clear: that there are two levels of attitude, one which 
is in some sense innate, and which gives rise to the other which is produced as a result of the first. 
In a different context, the second of Waltz's `Eight Principles for Building an Intelligent Robot' 
requires the inclusion of “innate drive and evaluation systems to provide the robot with moment-to-
moment guidance for its actions” (Waltz, 1991). In elaborating this principle, Waltz explains that the 
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action of a robot at a particular time should not just be determined by the current sensory inputs, but 
also the “desires” of the robot, such as minimizing energy expenditure (laziness), and maintaining 
battery power levels (hunger). 
Moffat & Frijda (1995) use a similar concept which they term ‘concerns’ which are “dispositions 
to prefer certain states and/or dislike others”. In their model the agent selects the most relevant 
information coming in through its sensors. The relevance of an event comes from the agents 
concerns. Thus for example if the agent detects food in its environment and this event is relevant to 
its hunger concern a goal may be generated to move towards the food and eat it. The most relevant 
event causes a signal to be emitted which in turn causes the relevant goal to be instantiated. 
All this varied research into robotics, artificial life, and autonomous agents and creatures has 
provided the impetus for a growth of interest in modeling motivations computationally, and a number 
of different representations for motivations and mechanisms for manipulating them have been 
developed at both subsymbolic and symbolic levels (e.g. (Balkenius, 1993; Halperin, 1991)). 
3.2 Motivated Behaviour in Autonomous Agents 
Responses made to a given stimulus can vary depending both on the internal state of the agent 
and/or the external situation (i.e. the environment). If the external situation remains constant, 
differences in response must be ascribed to changes in the internal state of the responding agent. 
These differences are due to the motivations of the agent.   
An agent can be thought of as having a fixed range of identifiable motivations of varying strength. 
These motivations can be regarded as being innate, and certain behaviours may be associated with 
one or more motivations. For example, sexual courtship behaviour might be associated with the 
motivation for reproduction. Executing the courtship behaviour may enable the agent to procreate 
with the partner, which typically will mitigate the motive to reproduce. These behaviours are known 
as consumatory behaviours; other behaviours such as courtship displays make the conditions of the 
consumatory behaviour come true, and are known as appetitive behaviours.  
This view of motivation is somewhat simplified, and although much behaviour occurs in 
functional sequences with appetitive behaviours leading to consumatory ones, complex interactions 
between motivations and behaviours are possible (Hinde, 1982).  For example, a single situational 
cue could relate to many motivations which in turn could release many activities, or cause an action 
which in turn leads to other behaviours, or even cause some motivations to decrease so that others 
would increase in turn. In addition there are inhibitory relationships between behaviours in animals 
and also relationships that increase the strength of other behaviours. Moreover, the combination of 
motivations may lead to different or variable behaviours. 
These are all difficult issues which must be addressed in attempting to construct accurate 
behavioural models of real and artificial agents. Our concern, however, is not with providing such 
accuracy, but in constructing simple yet adequate models which will allow effective control of 
behaviour. 
3.3 A Simple Example of Motivation In Autonomous Agents 
We can define autonomous agents to be agents with a higher-level control provided internally by 
motivations. Thus we can specify motivations of curiosity, safety, fear, hunger, and so on. In a 
simple agent design, we might then associate the motivation of safety with the goal of avoiding 
obstacles which, in turn, is associated with the actions required to achieve such results. Motivations 
will also vary over time according to the internal state of the agent. For example, if the agent spends 
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a long time without food, then the hunger motivation will increase. When the agent feeds, the hunger 
motivation will decrease.  
Each motivation thus has a strength associated with it, either variable depending on external and 
internal factors, or fixed at some constant value. A motivation can thus be represented by a triple, 
<m, v, b> known as an m-triple where m is the kind of motivation, v is a real number, the strength (or 
intensity, (Sloman, 1987)) value associated with that motivation, and b is a boolean variable taking 
the value True when the strength value, v, is fixed, and False when it is variable. An autonomous 
agent can be regarded as embodying a set of n motivations, M, which comprises the m-triples, <m1, v, 
b> …<mn, v, b>. Thus the set of motivations, M, is a function of the kind of agent being considered, 
while each motivation in this set at a particular point in time is a function of an instance of a 
particular kind of agent and its environment together. In order to act on motivations, a threshold 
value for strength may be necessary, which must be exceeded to force action. Alternatively, the 
highest strength value may be used to determine the motivation currently in control.  
More sophisticated mechanisms are possible such as those described by Norman and Long (1995; 
1996), Sloman (Sloman 1987; Beaudoin and Sloman, 1993), and Moffat and Frijda (Moffat and 
Frijda, 1995; Moffat et al., 1993). In addition, other representations for motivations and mechanisms 
for manipulating them have been developed at both subsymbolic and symbolic levels (e.g. by 
Schnepf (1991), Maes (1989a, 1989b, 1991) and Halperin (1991)). All are possible instantiations of 
the model described in the remainder of this paper, but the details are unimportant at present. It is 
enough to note that the abstract model provides the framework within which such mechanisms can be 
incorporated according to the particular need. 
4. THE SMART FRAMEWORK 
As has been described elsewhere in more detail (Luck and d’Inverno 1995), we propose a four-
tiered hierarchy comprising entities, objects, agents and autonomous agents. Underlying the SMART 
view of the world is the fundamental assumption that all components are entities. Some of these 
entities are objects, and some the objects are agents. In turn, some of the agents can be further 
specialised to autonomous agents. In this section, we briefly outline the agent hierarchy (Shown as a 
Venn diagram in Figure 1.). Many details are omitted – a more complete treatment can be found in 
(Luck and d’Inverno 1995). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Entity Hierarchy overview 
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Entities simply provide a way to denote components in the world before we have any recognisable 
structure for them, or before we can classify them as objects, agents or autonomous agents. Although 
we will not provide a mathematical treatment in this paper, the use of entities also enables a simple 
and elegant formal description to be provided. (Elsewhere, we provide extensive mathematical 
descriptions of the SMART framework in the Z specification language, based on the notion of 
entities.) Objects can then be defined to be just things that have abilities and attributes and with no 
further defining characteristics. Similarly, agents are just objects that are useful, typically to other 
agents, where this usefulness is defined in terms of satisfying some goal of these other agents. In 
other words, an agent is an object with an associated set of goals. Now, a particular object may give 
rise to different instantiations of agents that are created to satisfy some need of another agent. If we 
define agenthood in this way, then we also rely on the existence of these other agents to provide 
goals that are adopted in order to give some initial reason for creating or instantiating an agent in the 
first place. Carried to its logical end, however, we arrive at a situation where agents are only defined 
in relation to already existing agents, and a continuing chain of agent instantiation results. In order to 
escape an infinite regress of goal adoption, therefore, we can define autonomous agents, which are 
just agents that can generate their own goals from motivations. Thus autonomous agents, which set 
their own agendas, are distinguished from server agents by virtue of their ability not simply to satisfy 
or achieve goals, but to create them. 
For example, a knife can be an object. It has attributes specifying that it is solid, made of steel, is 
silver in colour and has a sharp edge.  Its capabilities specify that it can cut things.  If I cut a steak 
with a knife, then the knife is my agent for cutting the steak. The knife may not actually possess the 
goal, but it is certainly satisfying, or can be ascribed, my goal of cutting the steak. A robot that rivets 
a panel onto an aeroplane fuselage is also an agent, and if it has motivations such as hunger and 
achievement, then it is an autonomous agent. 
As explained above, this paper will not offer a mathematical treatment, but to illustrate the 
simplicity and elegance of the key notions underlying the SMART framework, we provide some very 
simple formal definitions. 
 
Entity = = [attributes: P Attribute; capableof: P Action; 
 goals: P Goal; motivations: P Motivations] 
 
Object = = [ Entity | capableof   
 
Agent = = [ Object | goals  { } ]  
 
AutonomousAgent = = [ Agent | motivations  
 
In summary, if there are attributes and capabilities, but no goals, then the entity is an object. If 
there are goals but no motivations, then the entity is an agent. Finally, if neither the motivation nor 
goal sets are empty, then the entity is an autonomous agent.  Thus, we have a simple but precise 
framework that identifies and characterises agents and autonomous agents, and distinguishes them 
clearly.  
4.1 Goal Generation 
Now, given that the key to our notion of autonomy is the ability of an agent to generate its own 
goals and set its own agenda, we turn our attention to that particular aspect. As stated above, the 
SMART framework involves the generation of goals from motivations in an autonomous agent, and 
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the adoption of goals by, and in order to create, other agents. In previous work we have given a 
complete formal description and specification of how autonomous agents, defined in terms of their 
high-level and somewhat abstract motivations, can construct goals.   
Autonomous agents will always try to find ways to mitigate motivations, either by selecting an 
action to achieve an existing goal as above for simple agents, or by retrieving a goal from a 
repository of known goals.  Thus, SMART requires a repository of known goals that capture 
knowledge of limited and well-defined aspects of the world. These goals describe particular states or 
sub-states of the world with each autonomous agent having its own such repository. 
Now, in order to retrieve goals to mitigate motivations, autonomous agents must have some way 
of assessing the effects of competing or alternative goals. Clearly, the goals which make the greatest 
positive contribution to the motivations of the agent should be selected unless a greater motivational 
effect can be achieved by destroying some subset of its goals. The motivational effect of generating 
or destroying goals not only depends on the motivations, but also on the goals of the agent. For 
example, an autonomous agent should not generate a goal that it already possesses or that is 
incompatible with the achievement or satisfaction of its existing goals. 
In general, agents may wish, or need, to use the capabilities of other entities. They can make use of 
the capabilities of these others by adopting their goals. For example, if Michael needs to write a 
paper that he cannot complete alone, he must get assistance from others. More specifically, he must 
persuade someone else to adopt his goal before the paper can be completed. Similarly, if he needs to 
work at home on the paper, he may need to use a floppy disk to take the current version of the paper 
home, and then use a laptop computer to continue writing and editing the paper. Indeed, in the course 
of writing the paper, both inanimate objects such as the computer and the disk may be needed, as 
well as other people to collaborate with. Each of these objects (including the people) can be ascribed, 
or viewed, as adopting Michael’s goals in order that his desire for success can be satisfied.  This 
notion of goal adoption underlies social behaviour, and an understanding of the ways in which it can 
be achieved is fundamental for effective modeling and simulation of agent systems. 
Thus, entities may serve the purposes of others by adopting their goals, but the ways in which they 
adopt goals depends on the kind of entity they are. In the description given above, goals may be 
generated only by autonomous agents, but both non-autonomous (server) and autonomous agents can 
adopt goals. With autonomous agents, goal adoption amounts to a problem of negotiation or 
persuasion, requiring an analysis of the target autonomous agent. With non-autonomous agents, goal 
adoption requires an analysis of both the agent intended to adopt the goal, and any other agent 
engaging that agent. With objects, no analysis is required, since agents are created from objects with 
the relevant associated goals. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Goal Adoption in Neutral-Objects, Server Agents and Autonomous Agents. 
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Figure 2 shows three fundamental cases of goal adoption, which we consider in detail below. In 
the figure, there are three kinds of agent. A target agent or object is one that is intended to adopt 
goals. An engaging agent is one whose goals are currently (already) adopted by the target agent. 
Finally, a viewing agent is an agent that seeks to engage a target agent or object by having it adopt 
goals. It is a viewing agent because the way in which goal adoption is attempted is determined by its 
view of the situation. We consider the three cases of goal adoption below. 
In the simplest case, goal adoption by non-autonomous agents occurs by instantiating an agent 
from a non-agent object or a neutral-object with the goals to be adopted. In this case, no agent exists 
before the goals are adopted, but the act of goal transfer causes an agent to be created from a neutral 
object using those particular goals. Thus, for example, a cup in Steve and Mark’s office, which is just 
a neutral-object, becomes an agent when it is used for storing Steve’s tea. In this case it adopts or is 
ascribed his goal of storing liquid. It is possible to create the agent from the object because the cup is 
not being used by anyone else; it is not engaged by another agent. An entity can only be a neutral 
object if it is not engaged. 
If the target object is engaged by other agents then it is itself an agent, so the protocol for goal 
adoption changes. In this case, there are several ways to engage the target object. The first involves 
supplying the target object with more goals that do not affect the existing agency obligations. 
(Obligations here simply refer to the existing relationships between entities by which one is engaged 
by another.) In this case the agent is shared between the viewing agent and the existing engaging 
agents. The second involves trying to persuade any engaging agents to release the engaged object so 
that it becomes a neutral-object and can therefore subsequently be engaged by the viewing agent as 
required. The third possibility involves displacing the engaging agent so that the engaged object 
becomes a neutral-object and can then subsequently be ascribed other goals. This possibility is 
dangerous since it may cause conflict with the previous engaging agents. 
As an example, suppose that a cup is currently in use as a paper-weight for Steve, so that the cup is 
Steve’s agent with his goal of securing loose papers. Suppose also, that Mark wishes to use the cup to 
have some tea. The first way for Mark to engage the cup is for him to attempt to use the cup without 
destroying the existing agency relationship between Steve and the cup. Since this would involve an 
awkward attempt at making tea in, and subsequently drinking from, a stationary cup, he may decide 
instead to try other alternatives. The second alternative is to negotiate with Steve to release the cup so 
that it can be used for storing tea while the third alternative is for Mark to displace the goal ascribed 
to the cup by removing the cup from the desk and pouring tea into it. The cup is no longer an agent 
for Steve and is now ascribed the goal of storing tea for Mark. It has switched from being engaged by 
Steve to being engaged by Mark, and this is equivalent to the agent reverting to an object and then 
being re-instantiated as a new agent. This method may not be an appropriate strategy, however, 
because in destroying the agent obligation of the cup as a paper-weight, there is a risk of conflict 
between Steve and Mark. 
In the example above, the second possibility for goal adoption by server-agents involves Mark 
persuading Steve to first release the cup from its existing agenthood. The cup would then become a 
neutral-object and could be instantiated as required by Mark. In general, such persuasion or 
negotiation may be more difficult than the direct physical action required for goal adoption in non-
autonomous entities. Autonomous agents are motivated and as such, only participate in an activity 
and assist others if it is to their motivational advantage to do so (that is, if there is some motivational 
benefit). They create their own agendas and for them, goal adoption is a voluntary process as 
opposed to an obligatory one for non-autonomous agents. In a similar example, Michael might ask 
Steve to assist in writing a paper, but Steve may refuse. This notion of volunteering to do something 
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refers to the choice that distinguishes an autonomous agent - autonomous agents have the ability to 
decide whether to cooperate or not, in line with their own agendas. 
In general, goals must be adopted through explicit autonomous agent initiative, as opposed to an 
ascription of goals for non-autonomous agents. However, in some contexts the ascription of goals to 
autonomous agents may be meaningful. Suppose, as a dramatic yet unlikely example, that Steve 
incapacitates Mark in some way but manipulates the unconscious victim so that he functions as a hat 
stand. In this situation, the autonomous agent, Mark, could be ascribed the goal of holding hats even 
though he has not explicitly adopted this goal. Such cases can be described by considering the 
autonomous agent as an agent in an obligatory relationship.  
5. DISCUSSION  
As we have explained elsewhere (Luck and d’Inverno, 1995), Franklin and Graesser's definition of 
an autonomous agent as a system that pursues “its own agenda” (Franklin and Graesser, 1997) 
reinforces the perspective in this paper. However, it is important to recognise that an autonomous 
agent in this view is still free to generate the goal to relinquish its autonomy by entering into a 
supervisory or group relationship if it is in its own interest to do so. As humans, we do this all the 
time. Indeed, a major benefit of societal living is the access to members in the group who specialize 
in one activity or another; it is only sensible to defer to an expert's judgment in those areas we know 
little about. Similarly, an agent in a multi-agent system should be able to draw upon expert opinion or 
instruction in those cases where it has little domain knowledge. And a prerequisite for this is the 
willingness to allow others either to influence decisions or to make decisions on one’s own behalf. 
As stated earlier, however, all this exists within the context of enlightened self-interest. The answer 
to whether we can control autonomy depends on the viewpoint adopted. In the strong view, it is by 
definition impossible to control autonomy externally. At the same time, however, we can design 
agents with appropriate motivations and motivational mechanisms that constrain and guide agent 
behaviour as a result of internal imposition. In this way, control is on-board, and more and better 
processing of environmental information is required. 
The SMART agent hierarchy distinguishes clearly between objects, agents and autonomous agents 
in terms of goals and motivations. Such an analysis of the entities in the world not only provides 
appropriate structures so that different levels of functionality may be established, but also 
information as to how multiple entities or agents can cooperate to solve problems which could not be 
solved alone.  By basing the distinctions on function and purpose, we do not arbitrarily differentiate 
between knives and robots, for example, especially when it is not useful to do so. Instead, our 
motivation and goal-based analysis allows us to concentrate precisely on important aspects of multi-
agent interaction and problem-solving. In that context, we have considered the roles of goal 
generation and adoption. We have specified how and why goals must be generated in some 
autonomous agents in response to motivations, grounding chains of goal adoption, and further, how 
goals are adopted by objects, agents and autonomous agents in this agent model.  
This paper has looked at the issues surrounding the notion of autonomy in agent systems. We have 
discussed how there is a growing need for an explicit operationalization of the term in order that 
issues surrounding autonomy can be addressed. In the literature to date there appear two distinct yet 
related notions of autonomy. The first of these refers to the level to which an agent is free from 
dependence on other agents in the decision-making process. As such, autonomy here is a relative and 
continuous concept admitting many levels ranging from complete autonomy through consensus 
levels of autonomy to a complete lack of autonomy (as in command-driven agents). Difficult issues 
arise when considering how to determine when, and by how much, an autonomy level should be 
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changed. Should the impetus come from some supervisory power external to the agent or should the 
agent itself decide when to relinquish its autonomy? This last possibility links in with the second 
notion of autonomy as the ability to generate one’s own goals. Here, autonomy cannot be erased by 
dependence. Agents are free to generate the goal to submit to another’s authority or to share authority 
in the generation of a goal or in a decision-making process if, by doing so, the agent’s interests are 
best served. It is this latter notion that has been the main focus of this paper. 
One last consideration is needed with regard to autonomy: when is it needed? Autonomy’s main 
advantages of flexibility and robustness in the face of dynamic, open worlds can be distinctly 
undesirable in certain agent domains. Indeed, the strong view of autonomy can be very dangerous if 
used for example in military applications for tank or missile control. Indeed introducing autonomy 
into any form of safety critical domain demands extreme caution and extensive testing and may well 
be best served by other forms of agent control. Thus, we also need to consider the kinds of situations 
to which autonomy is suited. Whilst we have offered an absolute theoretical viewpoint of autonomy 
in the form of goal generation as well as the weaker alternative of dependence, which provides a 
practical realisation of autonomy that is useful for many, it is important to understand the difference 
in purpose and context of these notions, and not to be dogmatic in practical situations. Clearly, there 
is value in studying the general concept of autonomy, regardless of practical concerns, but we must 
also address ourselves to the practical issues. Ultimately, it matters little what we call autonomy (just 
as it matters little whether we call a program an agent) as long as it gives us the required robustness 
and flexibility we desire.  
In that sense, there is likely to be a convergence of the two views. The strong view offers better-
defined mechanisms for directly controlling autonomy, but with less obvious means of manipulation. 
Future work on autonomy should seek to provide such means of manipulation to enable better user-
control, and to allow application in the kinds of domains where user-intervention and control may be 
critical. This could be through non-invasive ways of coercing agents into certain decisions and 
behaviour, or possibly through some analogue of invasive courses of action like drugging, hypnosis, 
etc. Either way, the issues involved in agent autonomy are important, and some early results in this 
area are likely to provide a rich vein of future work. 
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